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I. INTRODUCTION
In the Netherlands the close corporation (besloten
vennootschap, BV) is one of the most important business forms for
small and medium sized businesses, next to partnerships. Different
from these partnerships, the BV has limited liability, meaning that
in principle its directors and shareholders are not personally liable
for the debts of the corporation. 1 Another important factor is that
BVs underlie a different tax regime than partnerships.

∗ Assistant Professor of Private Law, Maastricht University. I thank my
colleagues Stephan Rammeloo and Kid Schwarz for their valuable comments on
earlier drafts of this report.
1. In a nutshell, the partnership as such is not taxed, while partners are
subject to taxation. A BV, however, is indeed taxed.
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On October 1, 2012 new legislation came into force which
made the Dutch rules on BVs more flexible and attractive. Among
other things, the minimum capital requirement was abolished. The
new regime is often called the “flex BV.” As a result of these
changes, the BV, which developed out of the public company
limited by shares (naamloze vennootschap, NV), differs more from
the parent regime that applies to the NV, which remained
unaffected by the changes. There was growing criticism on the
rigid regime of the BV and the requirement of a minimum capital.
A number of other European jurisdictions did not demand a
minimum capital for close corporations. Moreover, under EU law
it became possible to use corporations (e.g., BV) established in
another EU Member State to do business in the Netherlands.
Foreign corporations could be used to circumvent the stringent
Dutch regime on BVs. This became the catalyst that made
legislative changes even more urgent. 2
In order to understand the position of the BV in Dutch law we
will first have a look at the historical developments since the early
seventeenth century. Paragraph III will discuss the abolition of
prior governmental approval, a requirement which has recently
been abolished for both the NV and the BV. Paragraph IV will
give an overview of some of the most important changes in the
legal regime of BVs. Paragraph V will discuss the use in the
Netherlands of companies established in other EU Member States.
Finally, the report will end with a very short note on the proposed
EC Regulation on a European close corporation.

2. Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31058, nr. 3, at 1; and HARM-JAN DE
KLUIVER ET AL., VEREENVOUDIGING EN FLEXIBILISERING VAN HET
NEDERLANDSE BV-RECHT, RAPPORT VAN DE EXPERTGROEP INGESTELD DOOR DE
MINISTER VAN JUSTITIE EN DE STAATSSECRETARIS VAN ECONOMISCHE ZAKEN,
6-7, 88 (2004).
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II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 3
The Dutch East India Company and the later West India
Company, both set up in the early seventeenth century, are often
regarded as the earliest company type in modern history. The
directors and shareholders were not personally liable for the debts
of the company. 4 Yet, it would be misleading to see them as the
earliest form of NV, in the strict sense of the word. It lacked an
important feature of a modern company, which is a general
shareholder meeting. Moreover, the government’s influence on the
company was so great that the company could be seen as half
private law, half a public entity, with far-reaching public powers,
such as police and military powers, and public administrative
powers. 5 The States General (i.e., the Dutch government) used the
company for the financing of their warfare against the Spanish and
the Portuguese, and for governing the overseas settlements. The
shareholders had only limited influence on the company, and their
financial interests were not always the primary interests of the
company. There is no straight clear line of development from these
companies to the modern company types.
During the eighteenth century the Dutch company developed
more and more in the direction of a modern company type. There
was no legislation giving any structure to companies, enabling the
company to develop freely. Next to the Dutch East India Company
and the Dutch West India Company, which had strong
governmental influence, a new type of company developed which
had no governmental influence. It was set up purely for
3. See JOHAN MATTHIJS DE JONGH, TUSSEN SOCIETAS EN UNIVERSITAS. DE
BEURSVENNOOTSCHAP EN HAAR AANDEELHOUDERS IN HISTORISCH PERSPECTIEF
(2014). Much of the historical information in this paragraph is based on this
book. A summary of the book is available in English at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2368748 (Last visited August 20, 2014). See also
HENDRIK MARTIJN PUNT, HET VENNOOTSCHAPSRECHT VAN HOLLAND, ZEELAND
EN WEST-FRIESLAND IN DE RECHTSPRAAK VAN DE HOGE RAAD VAN HOLLAND,
ZEELAND EN WEST-FRIESLAND (2010).
4. DE JONGH, supra note 3, at 69, 72.
5. Id. at 63-67, 102-10.
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commercial reasons, but which in some cases retained some form
of personal liability of directors and supervisors. 6 For that reason
they had more similarity with partnerships than with companies.
During this period only thirty-nine companies were set up, mainly
insurance companies. Some of these companies were the first to
issue bearer shares. Whereas the Dutch East India Company had
already issued bearer bonds, its shares were not on bearer but
registered in the name of its holder. 7
A major change in Dutch legislation was caused by the
annexation of the Netherlands by the French Empire in 1810. Not
only the French Code civil of 1804, but also the Code de commerce
of 1807, became applicable in the Netherlands from 1811 onwards.
It introduced the French société anonyme into Dutch law, a
company type based on contract 8 and called “anonymous” because
the names of the participants were not mentioned in the company
name. 9 Its structure hardly differed and was not any clearer than
that of the Dutch private law companies of the late eighteenth
century. Moreover, the Code de commerce introduced a form in
between the société en commandite and the société anonyme by
acknowledging the société en commandite par actions, 10 a
company form that was not adopted in the Dutch Commercial
Code (Wetboek van Koophandel) of 1838. The shares in this type
of company could even be bearer shares, according to French case
law. 11
The Netherlands have had their own legislation on companies
since the enactment of the Dutch Commercial Code in 1838. The
relevant provisions on companies were updated in 1929, when new
6. Id. at 161-164.
7. EGIDIUS J. J. VAN DER HEIJDEN, HANDBOEK VOOR DE NAAMLOOZE
VENNOOTSCHAP NAAR NEDERLANDSCH RECHT nr. 6-7 (3d ed. 1936); and PUNT,
supra note 3, at 112, 212.
8. Article 18 Code de commerce (1807). See also FRANÇOIS MALEPEYRE
& CHARLES JOURDAIN, TRAITÉ DES SOCIÉTÉS COMMERCIALES nr. 265 (1836).
9. Article 29 Code de commerce (1807).
10. Id. at art. 38.
11. Cour Royale de Paris (02.07.1832), XXIV JOURNAL DU PALAIS 682 (3d
ed. 1841). See also MALEPEYRE & JOURDAIN, supra note 8, at nr. 235.
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provisions on companies with a smaller number of shareholders
were introduced, welcoming a more private form of company. In
1971, a separate regime for BVs was introduced into Dutch law. A
few years later, in 1976, the provisions on limited companies were
removed from the Commercial Code and were made part of a new
Book 2 of the Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek, BW). 12
III. GOVERNMENTAL APPROVAL
Since the early nineteenth century, governmental approval for
the incorporation of a company has been controversial. The French
Code de commerce, which was introduced in the Netherlands in
1811, required royal (governmental) approval in order to protect
the company’s shareholders against misuse of the company. 13 At
first the royal approval was little more than a formality, 14 but from
around 1828 the requirements for royal approval became much
stricter. The government actively demanded changes in various
articles of association in order to protect creditors and to strengthen
the position of minority shareholders against larger shareholders. 15
In the Dutch Commercial Code of 1838 the requirement of
governmental approval was maintained, but the approval could
only be withheld if the articles of association violated the law or
were contrary to the public order or good morals (article 37). The
12. This was part of a trend that developed since the end of the nineteenth
century to remove the differences between commercial law and civil law. It also
aimed to eliminate the need for a separate commercial code. However, the
commercial code is still partly in existence. Large parts have already been
removed (e.g., the law of bankruptcy, which since 1895 forms a separate
bankruptcy statute). Some of the remaining parts of the commercial code, such
as the law of commercial partnerships, will remain in existence for many years
to come. Civil partnerships (societas) are still governed by provisions from the
1838 BW.
13. Michel Louis Étienne Regnaud, Procès-verbal du Conseil d’État,
Séance du 15 janvier 1807, nr. 4 in JEAN-GUILLAUME LOCRÉ, XI LÉGISLATION
CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE 99-100 (1837); Michel Louis Étienne
Regnaud, Exposé des motifs in JEAN-GUILLAUME LOCRÉ, XI LÉGISLATION
CIVILE, COMMERCIALE ET CRIMINELLE 163-66 (1837); and MALEPEYRE &
JOURDAIN, supra note 8, at nr. 273, n. 1.
14. DE JONGH, supra note 3, at 181.
15. Id. at 185.
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requirement survived the 1929 changes in the Commercial Code,
the introduction of the BV into Dutch law in 1971, and the renewal
of both the regime on public companies limited by shares and on
BVs in 1976, when the current Book 2 of the Civil Code was
enacted. Gradually, the reason for governmental approval had
changed into the prevention of defrauding creditors (bankruptcy
fraud), more recently also money laundering and, very recently, the
financing of terrorist activities.
As a result of continued criticism, the system of governmental
approval was finally abolished on July 1, 2011. It was replaced
with a system of permanent supervision by the Ministry of Safety
and Justice. 16 The new supervision system is based on linking
information from various electronic databases. At the time of
drafting this report the system still did not function adequately as a
result of technical problems.
IV. NEW REGIME FOR CLOSE CORPORATIONS 17
A. Capital Requirements
Minimum capital requirements for NVs and for BVs were
introduced in 1978. 18 As a result of the second EEC Directive on
company law of 1976, 19 the introduction of minimum capital
requirements had become necessary for public companies limited
by shares, but the Dutch legislator voluntarily also introduced a
16. Wet controle op rechtspersonen (Statute on Supervision of Legal
Persons).
17. See also for a recent overview of the new Dutch regime on BVs:
Stephan Rammeloo, The Law of Close Corporations in NETHERLANDS REPORTS
TO THE NINETEENTH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW (Lars
van Vliet ed. 2014).
18. As from June 1, 1978, a BV or NV could only be set up with a
minimum capital of 35.000 guilders. As from September 1, 1981, the minimum
capital for the NV was raised to 100.000 guilders. The minimum capital for the
BV was raised to 40.000 guilders on January 20, 1986. Before 1978, there was
indeed no minimum capital requirement, yet directors of the company could be
held personally liable for all acts taken place before at least 10% of the share
capital had been contributed to the company (art. 36g Dutch Commercial Code).
19. Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of December 13, 1976, as
amended by EU Directive 2012/30.
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minimum capital requirement for BVs. The main reason for
introducing such a requirement was to protect creditors of the
company. 20 However, it appears that a minimum capital
requirement is not a very effective way of protecting creditors,
because it only demands a certain minimum for setting up a
company. It does not guarantee that after incorporation the
minimum capital will be maintained. 21 Moreover, it does not
require corporations to file for bankruptcy once the capital sinks
below the minimum threshold.
Until the 2012 amendment, a minimum capital of €18,000 was
needed for the incorporation of a BV. Under the new regime, that
minimum capital requirement has been abolished. The legislature
preserved the requirement of a minimum capital of €45,000 for
NVs because EU law 22 requires all Member States to set a
minimum capital requirement for public companies limited by
shares, such as the NV.
B. Capital Controls
To compensate for the abolition of the minimum capital
requirement for BVs, the new regime introduced two capital
controls. The first one is a balance-sheet test: according to article
2:216(1) BW, the general meeting of shareholders can only agree
on paying out the profits exceeding the reserves prescribed by law
and by the articles of incorporation.
The second capital control is called the payment test. Article
2:216(2) BW provides that a decision of the general meeting of
shareholders to pay out profits has no consequences unless the
20. See the preamble of the Directive. See also, generally, PAUL L. DAVIES,
INTRODUCTION TO COMPANY LAW 75 (2d ed. 2010); and PETRI MÄNTYSAARI,
III THE LAW OF CORPORATE FINANCE: GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND EU LAW 14547 (2010).
21. DE KLUIVER ET AL., supra note 2, at 88; and REINIER H. KRAAKMAN ET
AL., THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW: A COMPARATIVE AND FUNCTIONAL
APPROACH §5.2.2 (2d ed. 2009).
22. Article 6 of Second Council Directive 77/91/EEC of December 13,
1976.
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board of directors has given its permission. The next sentence of
the provision adds that this permission shall only be withheld if the
board of directors knows or reasonably can foresee that after the
payment the corporation will no longer be able to pay the debts
that are due.
Article 2:216(3) BW adds a severe sanction to this. If, after a
payment, the corporation is no longer able to pay its debts that are
due, and at the time of payment the directors knew or should
reasonably have foreseen that consequence, the directors are
personally and jointly liable. A director, however, who proves that
he cannot be blamed for the payment and that he has tried to
counteract the consequences of the payment, will not be held
liable. The persons who accepted the payment, and who at the time
of payment knew or should reasonably have foreseen that the
corporation would no longer be able to pay its debts that are due,
should pay the shortage of the corporation’s capital to a maximum
of the amount received by them. If the directors already paid the
shortage, the recipients of the payment should make this payment
to these directors.
C. New Types of Shares
Since 2012, the BV may have shares without voting rights and
shares with multiple or limited voting rights, and shares that give
no right or only a limited right to the profits and reserves of the
company (e.g., right to payment of dividends), as prescribed in
articles 2:228(4)-(5) and 2:216(7) BW. The new law introduces,
for example, the possibility of issuing non-voting shares, 23
conditional voting shares and preferred non-voting shares. It
allows, for instance, founders of businesses to issue and transfer
23. The need for introducing non-voting shares had already been
demonstrated a long time before by Schwarz. See CHRISTIAAN ANTON
SCHWARZ, AANDELEN ZONDER STEMRECHT (1990). Whereas he advocated nonvoting shares for both the NV and the BV, it has now been introduced only for
the BV.
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shares to members of their families without giving them voting
rights at the same time. To give another example: if two
companies, A and B, set up a joint venture with equal voting
rights, but A invests more capital into the joint venture than B, the
joint venture corporation can issue non-voting rights to A to reflect
the larger investment by A. 24 A similar result can be achieved by
issuing to A and B an equal amount of shares with equal voting
rights, and by attaching to the A-shares a larger right to profits and
reserves.
In addition, the new legislation allows the company to stipulate
in the articles of incorporation that the shareholder is subjected to a
duty in his capacity as a shareholder in such a way that the duty
passes on to a new shareholder in the case of sale and transfer of
the share. For example, the articles of incorporation may oblige the
shareholder to make an additional contribution to the corporation’s
capital when the capital sinks under a certain threshold of
solvability, 25 or a duty to buy goods or supply goods to the
company, a duty to buy shares in the company from another
shareholder or a non-competition clause. 26 It is also possible to
stipulate, for example, that if the shares are inherited, the heirs
should sell and transfer their shares to the other shareholders
(article 2:192(1)(c) BW). That article reads as follows:
The articles of incorporation may as to all shares or as to shares
of a certain sort or denomination:
a) stipulate that obligations, as against the company or third
parties or between shareholders, are connected to the status of
shareholder;
b) subject the status of shareholder to certain requirements;

24. For practical examples see Najat Rachak, Het stemrechtloze aandeel:
een interessant instrument, 5 VENNOOTSCHAP & ONDERNEMING 79-82 (2013).
25. CHRISTIAAN ANTON SCHWARZ, INLEIDING TOT HET NIEUWE BV-RECHT
13 (2012).
26. DE KLUIVER ET AL., supra note 2, at 49-50.
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c) stipulate that the shareholder is in certain cases, mentioned
in the articles of incorporation, under a duty to offer and transfer
his shares or a part thereof.
The Minister of Justice indicates that the obligations mentioned
in article 2:192 BW are not connected to the shares but rather to
the status of shareholder. The reason for the remark is as follows:
if the obligation is introduced into the articles of incorporation
already in existence and the shareholder voted against the change
of the articles of incorporation, or at least did not agree to the
change, the shareholder is not bound by the obligation, even if
afterwards the shareholder acquires additional shares in the
company. For that reason the Minister regards the freedom of this
obligation personal. 27 If, however, this free shareholder transfers
his or her shares to a bound shareholder or a third party (who is not
yet a shareholder) the transferee will be bound by the obligation.
We can, therefore, conclude that the obligation burdens and runs
with the share. 28 Yet, in that case, the Minister’s remark that the
obligation is not linked to the share but rather to the status of
shareholder is misleading.
In property law it is sometimes said that owners of property are
bound in their quality of owners of that property. For example, in
the case of servitudes, the owners of servient tenements are bound
to an obligation in their quality of owners. Another way of
expressing the same situation is saying that the obligation burdens
the servient tenement. Both expressions are regarded as equivalent.
In the law of servitudes, often only negative duties are permitted
(duties to tolerate or not to act) and positive duties cannot run with

27. GERARD VAN SOLINGE & MARCO
HANDLEIDING TOT DE BEOEFENING VAN HET

NIEUWE WEME, 2-IIa ASSER'S
NEDERLANDS BURGERLIJK RECHT

nr. 298 (2013).
28. Kamerstukken II 2008/2009, 31058, nr. 6, at 38; Kamerstukken II
2006–2007, 31 058, nr. 3, at 4 and 47. It also follows from art. 2:192a BW,
which mentions exceptional cases in which the third party, like the transferor, is
not bound to the obligation.
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the land. This Roman law principle 29 is still valid in many modern
jurisdictions, although Dutch law recognizes a few minor
exceptions. However, the new regime for the flexible BV allows
positive duties to run with the shares in the company, something
which historically has been regarded as unacceptable in property
law.
D. Transfer Restriction
Under the old regime, every BV had to have a transfer
restriction for the voluntary transfer of the shares (e.g., upon sale).
The new regime, however, allows the articles of association to
stipulate that there will be no transfer restriction (article 2:195(1)
BW). Another innovation is that the articles of association may
also provide that (a certain class of) shares in the corporation
cannot be transferred for a certain time. In the past these lock-up
rules were often laid down in shareholder agreements, but it was
uncertain whether they were valid. 30 Similarly, it was uncertain
whether a lock-up time could be validly laid down in the articles of
association. A lock-up time is especially important for jointventures with large initial investments. 31
Under the new regime, the default rule is still that there will be
a transfer restriction. If the articles of association do not provide
otherwise, there will be a transfer restriction demanding that
shareholders who plan to transfer their shares should first offer
these shares to the other shareholders (article 2:195(1) BW). The
articles of association can also impose a different form of transfer
restriction in which any transfer should be approved by a body
mentioned in the articles of association, e.g., the general meeting

29. D. 8.1.15.1. There was an exception to the rule in the form of the
servitus oneris ferendi: the duty to maintain or rebuild a wall that gives support
to a neighboring building (D.8.5.6.2).
30. SCHWARZ, supra note 25, at 35-36.
31. DE KLUIVER ET AL., supra note 2, at 54-56.
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of shareholders. Any transfer in contravention of the transfer
restriction will be void (article 2:195(4) BW).
It should be noted that the possibility to subject the status of the
shareholder to certain requirements (article 2:192(1)(b) BW) may
also restrict the transferability of the shares by limiting the number
of parties to whom the shares may be offered. An example is a BV
which owns an electricity plant and whose shareholders should all
be certain public bodies, like city councils or provinces. 32 Another
example, which is especially relevant for joint-ventures, is the
requirement that all shareholders should be a party to a certain
shareholder agreement. This ensures that the contractual rights and
duties from the shareholder agreement, which do not run with the
shares automatically, pass to any new shareholder.
A transfer of the shares to heirs does not fall within the scope
of article 2:195 BW. A transfer restriction, therefore, cannot block
a transfer to the heirs. However, as mentioned earlier, the articles
of association may stipulate that heirs who inherit shares should
offer them to the other shareholders (article 2:192(1)(c) BW).
Indirectly, it has a somewhat similar effect of restricting the free
transferability.
V. NUMERUS CLAUSUS AND THE USE OF FOREIGN COMPANY TYPES
IN THE NETHERLANDS
Dutch company law as laid down in the BW has a numerus
clausus of legal persons. This means that Dutch law only awards
legal personality to those structures recognized in the civil code as
legal persons. Similarly to the numerus clausus in Dutch property
law, Dutch law not only limits the types of legal persons under
national law but also made the rules applicable to these types, in
principle, mandatory.
As a result of case law of the European Court of Justice,
however, this numerus clausus has been watered down
32. HR January 21, 2011, NJ 2011/97; JOR 2011/112 (Essent v. Delta).
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considerably. One can run a business in the Netherlands making
use of a legal person established in another EU member state or
one of the European Economic Area states according to the law of
that other EU member state or EEA state. Dutch private
international law applies the so-called incorporation principle,
according to which corporations are governed by the law of the
state in which the corporation was established (the seat mentioned
in the contract of partnership or the articles of incorporation). 33
The Pro-Forma Foreign Companies Act 34 indeed does form a
hurdle, but in the case Inspire Art, the European Court of Justice35
held that this statute is contrary to the principle of freedom of
establishment as laid down in articles 49 and 54 TFEU. 36 As a
result, this hurdle has almost completely been removed for
corporations with a registered seat in another EU or EEA member
state. The ECJ held, among other things, that:
The reasons for which the company was formed in that
other Member State, and the fact that it carries on its
activities exclusively or almost exclusively in the Member
State of establishment, do not deprive it of the right to
invoke the freedom of establishment guaranteed by the
Treaty, save where abuse is established on a case-by-case
basis. 37
The Pro-Forma Foreign Companies Act has been changed so
that, apart from article 6, it no longer applies to corporations from
other EU and EEA member states (article 1(2)). 38

33. Paul Vlas, Groene Serie, Rechtspersonen, artikel 118 Boek 10 BW, note
1 (2013); and STEPHAN RAMMELOO, CORPORATIONS IN PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW 96-127 (2001).
34. Wet op de formeel buitenlandse vennootschappen.
35. Case C-167/01, Inspire Art Ltd, 2003 E.C.R. I-10195. See Stephan
Rammeloo, Vrij verkeer van rechtspersonen in Europa na HvJ EG Inspire Art
Ltd.: zetelleercontroverse beslecht!, 3 NIPR 283-95 (2004).
36. Paul Vlas, Groene Serie, Rechtspersonen, regeling Wet op de formeel
buitenlandse vennootschappen, note 3 (2013).
37. 2003 E.C.R. I-10226, § 105.
38. Via art. 6 (liability for annual account and report) some of the liability
provisions from Book 2 of the BW are applicable.
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One of the aims of the numerus clausus of legal persons is the
protection of creditors. In some cases, the directors of a NV or BV
can be held liable in person for the debts of the company.
In the area of liability the relaxation of the numerus clausus by
EU law is compensated by the standardization of the liability
regime in insolvency. Articles 2:138 and 2:149 BW—which deal
respectively with liability of executive directors and liability of
non-executive directors—apply via article 10:121 BW, and are
applicable in the bankruptcy proceedings of a “corporation” that
has been declared bankrupt in the Netherlands. 39 This article
covers, among other things, NVs and BVs (article 10:117 BW).
Moreover, creditors of a company seated in the Netherlands, but
set-up in a foreign state, can hold the directors of the company
liable in tort, according to article 6:162 BW, which applies via
article 4(1) Rome II. 40
The uniform regime of liability is not even pierced by the
introduction of the European Company (Societas Europaea, SE).
Article 51 of the EC Regulation 2157/2001 provides that internal
liability (liability as against the legal person) is subject to national
law. As the external liability (liability against creditors) is not
covered by the EC Regulation, it is equally subject to national law
under articles 9 and 10 of the EC Regulation. 41
VI. THE EUROPEAN CLOSE CORPORATION
The recent changes in Dutch company law aim at making
Dutch company forms, especially the BV, more attractive. As
foreign company types can be used in the Netherlands, especially
39. See, for example, Rb Dordrecht December 19, 2012,
ECLI:NL:RBDOR:2012:BY7080 (Circus).
40. “Rome II” is the Regulation (EC) No 864/2007 of July 11, 2007 on the
law applicable to non-contractual obligations. Paul Vlas and Marek Zilinsky,
Drie jaar Rome II in de rechtspraktijk, 60 ONDERNEMINGSRECHT § 2 (2012).
41. Hylda Esther Boschma & Johanna Neeltje Schutte-Veenstra, Tekst &
Commentaar, Ondernemingsrecht, artikel 51 SE-verordening, note 1 (2012); and
Friedemann Eberspächer, SE-VO Art 51 Haftung, Rn 1 in 2 AKTIENGESETZ
(Gerald Spindler & Eberhard Stilz eds., 2d ed. 2010).
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but not only company forms of other EU and of EEA member
states, there is international competition of company forms. In
2008, the European Union proposed a Regulation introducing a
European close corporation, called the European private company,
also referred to as SPE (Societas Privata Europaea). 42 The aim is,
among other things, to lower the costs of incorporating a close
corporation and the costs of operating throughout the European
single market. This new European close corporation should
facilitate small and medium sized businesses. The proposed
regulation should also complement the SE, which was already
introduced in 2001. 43
VII. CONCLUSIONS
One of the age-old problems of company law is the danger that
companies are used to defraud creditors and the danger that large
shareholders act against the interests of minority shareholders. In
protecting the interests of creditors and minority shareholders the
legislator often runs the risk of making the mandatory rules of
company law too rigid. However, under EU law it is now possible
to do business in the Netherlands with a corporation set up
according to the laws of another EU or EEA member state and, by
doing so, evade the Dutch regime on BVs. This scenario was the
catalyst for the 2012 changes. In order to make the Dutch BV less
rigid and thus more attractive to businesses, the Dutch legislator
enacted a new regime which abolished the minimum capital
requirement and instead introduced a different way of protecting
the interests of creditors.
The changes also introduced new types of shares, such as
shares without any voting rights and shares with multiple or
limited voting rights, and also shares that give no right or only a
limited right to the profits and reserves of the company (e.g., the
42. Proposal for a Regulation COM (2008) 396 on the Statute for a
European Private Company.
43. Regulation 2157/2001 of October 8, 2001.

286

JOURNAL OF CIVIL LAW STUDIES

[Vol. 7

right to payment of dividends). Close corporations now have the
possibility of issuing non-voting shares, conditional voting shares
and preferred non-voting shares. In addition, it is now possible to
link obligations to shares so that they run with the shares upon
their sale and transfer.

